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We examine the effect of the 1996 welfare reform legislation on participation in the 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program by immigrants. Although none of the 
immigrants on the SSI rolls before welfare reform lost eligibility, the potential exists for 
future impacts on the SSI caseload and the well-being of recent immigrants. We use 
microdata files from the Social Security Administration’s Continuous Work History 
Sample matched to administrative data on SSI participation for the period 1993 to 1999. 
We estimate simple models of SSI participation and compare our results to the existing 
literature. We then estimate a series of difference-in-differences models of SSI 
participation. These models compare SSI participation by immigrants relative to native-
born individuals, and among affected immigrants relative to unaffected immigrants and 
native-born individuals, before and after welfare reform. Descriptive results indicate that 
the percentage of immigrants and natives receiving SSI decreased after welfare reform, 
but by a larger percentage for natives than for immigrants. The probability of 
SSI participation decreased after welfare reform for immigrants who were affected by the 
legislation relative to immigrants who were unaffected. The difference-in-differences 
estimate is positive for immigrants relative to otherwise similar natives, but the estimated 
effect among affected immigrants is about half as large as the effect for unaffected 
immigrants. When the sample is limited to low earners as a proxy for the SSI means test, 
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Introduction 
Taxes and transfers are potentially important channels through which redistributions 
occur from natives to immigrants.  An important issue that arises in this context involves 
immigrant participation in welfare programs.  Although some evidence suggests that immigrants, 
especially more recent immigrants, are less likely to participate in welfare programs than 
otherwise comparable natives (Borjas and Trejo, 1991; Blau, 1984; Tienda and Jensen, 1986), 
significant transfers from natives to immigrants still may occur.  In the United States, two of the 
most important welfare programs that involve the foreign born are the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF, formerly Aid for Families with Dependent Children or AFDC) and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.  Some evidence suggests that immigrant 
participation in social welfare programs rises with duration of residence in the United States 
(Blau, 1984), and this tendency should be particularly marked for SSI, one component of which 
provides benefits specifically for older persons.  Partially in response to immigrant usage of 
welfare, in 1996 the U.S. Congress implemented welfare reforms that limited the access of non-
citizens to welfare.  The present study, which specifically concerns SSI, seeks to determine how 
successful Congress was in forbidding or discouraging foreign-born participation in this 
program. 
Congress established the SSI program in 1972, and the program actually began making 
payments in January, 1974.  This means-tested program was to provide cash assistance to needy 
aged, blind, and disabled citizens and noncitizens lawfully admitted for permanent residence or 
permanently residing under color of law.  Between 1974 and the present, the program underwent 
many changes that affected the eligibility of noncitizens, and participation by noncitizens 
changed dramatically.  Both the absolute number of immigrants receiving SSI benefits and the   3
number of immigrants receiving SSI benefits as a percentage of all SSI recipients increased 
substantially between 1982 and 1995.  This is particularly true among the elderly.  In 1982, 
127,900 SSI recipients were non-citizen immigrants, representing 3.3 percent of the total 
caseload.  By 1995, 785,410 SSI recipients, or 12.1 percent of the caseload, were non-citizen 
immigrants.  Among elderly SSI recipients, 91,900 (5.9 percent) were non-citizen immigrants in 
1982, compared to 459,220 (31.8 percent) in 1995 (Parrott, Kennedy, and Scott, 1998).  The 
average federally administered SSI payment to non-citizens in December 1995 was $422, 
compared to $309 for citizens (Social Security Administration, 1996, Table 5).  Given that U.S. 
immigration law has a strong family reunification component, the age composition of 
immigrants to the U.S. is becoming increasingly older, and the skill composition is becoming 
increasingly less skilled (Greenwood and McDowell, 1999), many expected that the upward 
trend in the proportion of SSI recipients who are immigrants would continue. 
In August, 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) was signed into law.  PRWORA, also referred to as welfare reform, substantially 
limited the eligibility of immigrants for SSI benefits and benefits from other social programs.  
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 further restricted 
immigrant access to the SSI program and strengthened provisions for sponsor-to-immigrant 
deeming of income in determining SSI eligibility.  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and 
subsequent legislation enacted in 1998 restored SSI eligibility to many groups of immigrants, but 
some are still denied access.  Parrott, Kennedy, and Scott (1998) provide a detailed legislative 
history of the debate surrounding SSI eligibility for immigrants. 
Generally speaking, immigrant eligibility for the SSI program includes only non-citizens 
who were lawfully in the United States as of August 22, 1996, and who were receiving SSI   4
benefits on August 22, 1996.  Refugees and asylees who entered the United States after August 
22, 1996, may be eligible for SSI under current law, but face a 7-year time limit on their 
eligibility.  Other non-citizens who entered the U.S. after August 22, 1996, may become eligible 
for SSI only by becoming U.S. citizens or by amassing 40 quarters of Social Security-covered 
employment.  All immigrants who apply for SSI benefits are subject to strict and legally 
enforceable provisions regarding sponsor-to-immigrant deeming. 
Although none of the non-citizens on the SSI rolls prior to August 22, 1996, lost SSI 
eligibility as a result of the legislative changes, the potential exists for substantial future impacts 
on SSI caseloads and program costs and on the well-being of recent immigrants themselves.  
Even among those non-citizens who are eligible for SSI, there may have been a “chilling effect” 
from the legislative changes (Fix and Passel, 1999), resulting in a decrease in the SSI application 
rate.  In addition, low-income and disabled non-citizens now have an incentive to become U.S. 
citizens in order to become eligible for SSI benefits.  Indeed, in 1996 and subsequent years the 
number of naturalizations increased significantly.  Borjas (2002) found a strong positive 
correlation between pre-welfare reform welfare utilization and post-welfare reform 
naturalization rates. 
It is well known that the AFDC/TANF caseload decreased substantially in the years 
immediately following passage of the welfare reform legislation.  The extent to which this 
decline is due to welfare reform or the strong economic growth experienced during the 1990s is 
the subject of much debate (Council of Economic Advisors, 1997; Moffitt, 1999; Figlio and 
Ziliak, 1999; Haider, Klerman, and Roth, 2003).  Some studies based on publicly-available 
survey data also cite a decline in the percentage of households receiving SSI in the years after 
welfare reform (Borjas, 2002; Fix and Passel, 2002).  Our descriptive analyses based on   5
individual-level data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) confirm these previous 
findings.  The percentage of immigrants receiving SSI decreased by about 5.5 percent between 
the pre-welfare reform period (1993 to 1995) and the post-welfare reform period (1997 to 1999).  
Importantly, however, the percentage of native-born individuals receiving SSI decreased by 
approximately 9.5 percent over that same period.  Moreover, the absolute number of noncitizens 
receiving SSI increased each year from 1997 to 2002, after an initial drop between 1996 and 
1997 (Social Security Administration, 2003). 
In the analysis that follows, using administrative data sources from SSA, we estimate 
models of SSI participation by immigrants in years prior to welfare reform and in years since 
welfare reform.  Results for the pre-reform and post-reform years are contrasted to identify 
changes in the underlying relationship between immigrant characteristics and SSI participation.  
Changes in participation outcomes may be the result of changes in the laws (e.g., welfare reform 
legislation) or program rules, changes in the (age, sex, skill, source country) composition of the 
immigrant population, and changes in economic conditions.  We attempt to isolate the effect of 
changes in the law through the use of difference-in-differences models of the probability of SSI 
participation. 
In the next section, we discuss the data used in this study.  Subsequent sections describe 
the models and methodology employed here, as well as the empirical results.  The final section 
provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
Data 
Prior studies of welfare receipt among immigrants have relied on decennial Census data 
(e.g., Bean, Van Hook, and Glick, 1997; Borjas and Trejo, 1993).  However, Bean and Van    6
Hook (1996-97) note several problems regarding the use of decennial Census data to study the 
two most common welfare programs (AFDC, now TANF, and SSI).  Van Hook, Bean, and Glick 
(1996) suggest several corrections to such data to make them better correspond to information 
from administrative records.  As noted by these authors and others, one of the most important 
advantages of decennial Census data is that the number of observations is great, which allows 
more detailed analyses, such as by country of birth. 
The data that underlie our study are derived from administrative records themselves.  Our 
samples, which contain about 3 million records (with about half of these for the foreign born) 
randomly selected from Social Security files, contain sufficient observations to allow detailed 
analyses both by country of birth and entry cohort.  Moreover, one of the major strengths of the 
data is that they have a temporal component that is lacking in decennial Census data, which 
provide information on sources of income (e.g., AFDC, SSI) only for the full year preceding the 
Census.  Because the data used here are annual, they allow us to develop observations for just 
before and just after welfare reform.  Since welfare reform occurred in 1996, we focus on the 
three years before (1993-1995) and the three years after (1997-1999). 
Relative to decennial Census data, administrative data are characterized by certain 
shortcomings.  The most important of these for our purposes is that they do not contain detailed 
economic, social, and demographic information.  For example, the data contain no information 
on education, health status, marital status, or family composition.  This is not to say that the data 
contain no socio-economic information.  Social Security records provide age, sex, and annual 
compensation (up to the Social Security maximum for contribution purposes). 
The SSA administrative records that we use are drawn from the one-percent Continuous 
Work History Sample (CWHS), which has been matched to the Social Security number   7
identification file.  Using these data, we develop a longitudinal sample of immigrants and natives 
prior to welfare reform and since welfare reform.  Place of birth codes on the Social Security 
number identification file allow for the identification of country of birth.  Date of establishment 
of the Social Security number (SSN) is used as a proxy for year of entry into the United States.  
The CWHS provides annual earnings for each individual by employer, major industry codes, and 
geography (employer-based prior to 1994, employee-residence-based starting in 1994). 
To the CWHS-based file is matched a longitudinal extract from the Supplemental 
Security Record that identifies monthly SSI participation and benefit amounts from the inception 
of the SSI program in January 1974 to the present.  The Supplemental Security Record also 
provides monthly SSI-countable earned and unearned income for SSI applicants and 
beneficiaries.  The number of observations in the analysis file supports detailed analyses of 
immigrant SSI participation by year, country of birth, year of entry, age, and sex. 
To account for local economic and policy conditions, we add data on state unemployment 
rates, state poverty rates, earnings per worker, state supplementation of federal SSI benefits, 
implementation of AFDC waivers, implementation of the TANF program, the maximum state 
AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of three, and the generosity of state programs for immigrants.  
State poverty rates and earnings per worker are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional 
Accounts Data.  State unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Data on the 
dates of implementation of AFDC waivers and the TANF program are from Crouse (1999).  
AFDC and TANF benefit levels and SSI state supplements are from various issues of the Green 
Book.  States are classified as more or less generous based on the index developed by the Urban 
Institute on the availability of state safety net programs for immigrants (Zimmermann and 
Tumlin, 1999, Table 18).   8
  
Models and Methodology 
We estimate two types of models: (1) basic SSI participation models with controls for 
immigrant status, and (2) difference-in-differences models that compare SSI participation by 
immigrants and natives, before and after welfare reform.  In the difference-in-differences 
models, we separately identify immigrants whose potential SSI eligibility was affected by 
welfare reform and those whose potential SSI eligibility was not affected by welfare reform. 
A series of basic SSI participation models are estimated and compared to the existing 
literature.  These models take the form: 
  i im l ik k ij j i T F Y X P ε α α α α α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0
*      (1) 
   0 if 1
* > = i i P P , and 
   0 0
* ≤ = i i P if P . 
Pi indicates SSI participation by individual i (or not); Xij is a vector of individual economic and 
demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, earnings); Yik is a vector of economic and policy 
conditions (e.g., unemployment rate, poverty rate, SSI state supplement, implementation of 
AFDC waivers, implementation of the TANF program, maximum AFDC/TANF benefit for a 
family of three, and generosity of programs for immigrants) in the state of residence; Fim is a 
vector of immigrant status variables (country of birth and year of entry); and, T is a fixed effect 
for the year of observation (1993 to 1999). 
We also estimate difference-in-differences models that exploit both variation over time 
(pre-welfare reform and post-welfare reform) and between immigrants and natives to identify the 
effect of welfare reform on SSI participation by immigrants.  The general form of the difference-
in-differences model is:   9
i i i
i i ik k ij j i
POSTWR FB
POSTWR FB Y X P
ε β
β β β β β
+
+ + + + + =
) * ( 5
4 3 2 1 0      (2) 
where FB is a dummy variable for immigrant status and POSTWR is a dummy variable 
indicating post-welfare reform periods.  All other variables are as previously defined.  In this 
model, native-born individuals are compared to all foreign-born individuals and the coefficient 
β5 is the difference-in-differences estimator.  This is a naïve model, however, in that it ignores 
the distinction between foreign-born individuals whose potential SSI eligibility was affected by 
welfare reform and those whose potential eligibility was not affected.  As discussed earlier, 
foreign-born individuals who were in the U.S. and receiving SSI benefits as of August 22, 1996, 
were not affected by the welfare reform legislation.  In addition, refugees and asylees remain 
potentially eligible for SSI benefits for the first seven years after entering the U.S. 
  Using data on the country of birth and date of entry into the U.S. (date of establishment 
of SSN) from the Social Security number identification file and receipt of SSI benefits from the 
Supplemental Security Record, we identify immigrants who were in the U.S. and receiving SSI 
benefits in 1996.  These immigrants are unaffected by the welfare reform legislation.  Again 
using country of birth and year of entry, relative to the year of observation, we identify refugees 
who have been in the U.S. for less than 7 years.  These immigrants also are unaffected by the 
welfare reform legislation.  For this purpose, we assume that all immigrants from the main 
refugee-sending countries – Russia and the former Soviet Union, Cuba, Bosnia, Iran, Vietnam, 
Somalia, and Iraq – are refugees.  Borjas (2002) uses a similar method to identify refugees.  All 
other immigrants not included in the groups described above are assumed to be affected by the 
welfare reform legislation.   10
We estimate three additional specifications of the difference-in-differences model to 
exploit the distinction between affected and unaffected immigrants.  In equation (3), we examine 
the difference between affected cases (AFFECTED=1) and unaffected cases (AFFECTED=0), in 
the post-reform period relative to the pre-reform period. 
i i i
i i ik k ij j i
POSTWR AFFECTED
POSTWR AFFECTED Y X P
ε γ
γ γ γ γ γ
+
+ + + + + =
) * ( 5
4 3 2 1 0     (3) 
The difference-in-differences estimator is γ5.  When we limit the sample to foreign-born 
individuals, the comparison is between affected immigrants and unaffected immigrants.  In this 
case, we expect γ3 to be negative, indicating a lower probability of SSI participation among 
affected immigrants relative to unaffected immigrants in the post-reform period relative to the 
pre-reform period.  When we use the full sample of native-born and foreign-born individuals, the 
difference-in-difference estimator provides a comparison between affected foreign-born 
individuals and all unaffected individuals, including both the native born and unaffected foreign 
born. 
Finally, in equation (4), we use the full sample of native-born and foreign-born 
individuals and separately identify native-born individuals (NB=1), affected foreign-born 
individuals (NB=0 and AFFECTED=1), and unaffected foreign-born individuals (NB=0 and 
AFFECTED=0). 
i i i i i
i i i ik k ij j i
POSTWR NB POSTWR AFFECTED
POSTWR NB AFFECTED Y X P
ε δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ
+ +
+ + + + + + =
) * ( ) * ( 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0  (4) 
From this model, we calculate three difference-in-differences effects.  The difference-in-
differences estimator for affected foreign-born individuals relative to unaffected foreign-born 
individuals is δ6.  The estimator for affected foreign-born individuals relative to native-born   11
individuals is (δ6 - δ7).  Finally, the difference-in-differences estimator for unaffected foreign-
born individuals relative to native-born individuals is -δ7. 
  All of the models described above ignore the fact that SSI is a means-tested program.  In 
other words, many of the individuals in our sample will be ineligible to participate because their 
income and/or assets exceed the SSI eligibility thresholds.  Although we cannot precisely 
measure SSI financial eligibility with our data, we create a rough proxy by calculating the 
maximum annual earnings that would be consistent with SSI income eligibility, assuming zero 
unearned income.  We then limit our sample to those individuals with earnings below this 
threshold (i.e., the low earner sample) and re-estimate equations (1) through (4).  The results are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 contains definitions of all variables used in this study, along with their means and 
standard deviations.  The full sample consists of about 3 million native-born and foreign-born 
individuals for the period 1993 to 1999.  Table 2 provides a different look at the descriptive 
statistics, broken down by time period (pre-welfare reform, year of welfare reform, and post-
welfare reform) and nativity (foreign born vs. native born).  Table 1 shows that 3.0 percent of 
foreign-born individuals received SSI benefits compared with 1.6 percent of native-born 
individuals over the 1993 to 1999 time period.  For the time periods shown in Table 2, the 
percentage of foreign-born individuals receiving SSI held steady at about 3.1 percent during the 
pre-reform period and the year of welfare reform, and then decreased to 2.9 percent during the 
post-reform period.  The percentage of native-born individuals receiving SSI decreased steadily 
from 1.7 percent in the pre-reform period to 1.6 percent in the year of welfare reform and 1.5   12
percent in the post-reform period.  In other words, the percentage of individuals receiving SSI 
decreased by about 5.5 percent among foreign-born individuals between the pre-welfare reform 
and post-welfare reform periods, compared to a decrease of about 9.5 percent for native-born 
individuals over the same period. 
Table 3 presents probit estimates of SSI participation for the combined native-born and 
foreign-born samples for the period 1993 to 1999.  The first regression includes a vector of 
personal characteristics, a vector of state economic and policy variables, and an indicator 
variable to identify foreign-born individuals.  The results indicate that the foreign born are 
significantly more likely to participate in SSI than the native born, that females are less likely to 
participate than males, and that older persons are less likely to participate than younger.  SSI 
participation was also significantly greater in states with relatively high unemployment rates and 
relatively high poverty rates.  It was lower in states that had relatively generous welfare policies 
toward immigrants.  SSI participation fell with the implementation of the state’s TANF program. 
The second regression in Table 3 replaces the foreign-born indicator with a series of 
indicators specific to individual countries (with the native born serving as the benchmark group).  
With only one exception (the catchall “other” group), each foreign-born group is more likely to 
participate than its native-born counterpart.  The countries that have contributed relatively large 
numbers of refugees particularly stand out.  This group includes Laos, Russia, Cuba, and 
Vietnam. 
The final regression in Table 3 focuses on entry cohorts.  Those cohorts that entered the 
U.S. before 1960 show significantly lower probabilities of SSI participation than natives.  
However, those cohorts that entered the U.S. between 1960 and 1996 all had significantly higher 
rates of participation than natives.  The fact that immigrant skills declined appreciably after 1965   13
is well recognized.  In 1965 (fully implemented in 1968), Congress moved away from the 
national origins quota system that placed more emphasis on skills (especially after 1952) and 
moved to an entry system based more on family reunification.  The lower probability of 
participation for the 1997 to 1999 entry cohort could be partly due to the 1996 changes that are 
our focus in this paper.  We explore this hypothesis more completely in the models that follow. 
Table 4 repeats the models presented in Table 3, but with the sample limited to 
individuals with low earnings as a rough proxy for SSI income eligibility.  The results are 
qualitatively the same as those presented for the full sample in Table 3, but the estimated 
coefficients are substantially larger in absolute value.  Among low earners, foreign-born 
individuals overall and from the 12 individual countries identified in column 2 are significantly 
more likely than natives to participate in the SSI program.  The estimates in column 3 show that 
immigrants who entered the U.S. before 1960 are less likely to participate than natives, as are 
immigrants who entered the U.S. after 1996.  Those who immigrated between 1960 and 1996 are 
significantly more likely than natives to participate in the SSI program. 
Results from the difference-in-differences models are reported in Table 5 for the full 
sample and in Table 6 for the low-earner sample, following the specifications in equations (2) 
through (4).  Table 7 summarizes the difference-in-differences estimators for the relevant 
comparison groups.  Model 1 compares the probability of SSI participation among foreign-born 
individuals relative to native-born individuals, after welfare reform relative to before welfare 
reform.  The results indicate that the foreign born are more likely to participate and that the 
probability of participation among both the foreign born and the native born decreased after 
welfare reform, all else equal.  The difference-in-differences term is positive and significant, 
indicating that the probability of SSI participation in the post-reform period increased for the   14
foreign born relative to otherwise similar native-born individuals.  This result is somewhat 
unexpected given the explicit focus of welfare reform on reducing welfare utilization among 
immigrants.  However, this model is naïve in that it does not account for the fact that certain 
groups of immigrants were unaffected by welfare reform. 
Model 2 makes the distinction between affected and unaffected immigrants.  For this 
model, the sample is limited to foreign-born individuals.  The results indicate that affected 
immigrants are significantly less likely to participate in the SSI program than otherwise similar 
unaffected immigrants.  After controlling for the composition of immigrants between the pre-
reform and post-reform period and differences in state economic and policy characteristics, the 
probability of SSI participation is higher in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform period.  
The difference-in-differences term is negative, indicating that relative to otherwise similar 
unaffected immigrants, the probability of SSI participation among affected immigrants decreased 
in the post-reform period.  The magnitude of the effect is extremely small when the full sample 
of foreign-born individuals is used (Table 5).  When the sample is limited to foreign-born 
individuals with low earnings as a rough proxy for SSI eligibility (Table 6), the difference-in-
differences effect is substantially larger (-0.14 percentage points). 
Models 3 and 4 add native-born individuals to the sample.  Model 3 controls for affected 
status but not nativity, whereas model 4 includes controls for both affected status and nativity.  
The results for model 3 are consistent with both model 1 and model 2.  The probability of SSI 
participation is significantly lower for affected immigrants than for unaffected individuals, which 
include both unaffected immigrants and native-born individuals.  The probability of SSI 
participation decreased overall in the post-reform period.  The difference-in-differences term is 
positive, indicating that the probability of SSI participation among affected immigrants in the   15
post-reform period increased relative to unaffected individuals.  This finding is largely because 
native-born individuals are included in the unaffected group, and their participation patterns 
swamp those of the much smaller group of unaffected immigrants. 
Model 4 includes the measures of affected status, and adds a control variable for nativity, 
as well as difference-in-differences terms for native-born relative to foreign-born individuals.  
This is the most complete model in that it allows us to estimate three difference-in-differences 
effects.  The basic results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that affected immigrants are less likely to 
participate in SSI than unaffected immigrants and that native-born individuals are significantly 
less likely to participate than immigrants.  The difference-in-differences effects are calculated 
and summarized in Table 7.  Relative to unaffected immigrants, the probability of SSI 
participation decreased among affected immigrants in the post-reform period, confirming the 
results from model 2.  For the low earner sample, the magnitude of that effect is -0.6 percentage 
points. 
The probability of SSI participation for both affected immigrants and unaffected 
immigrants, relative to native-born individuals, increased in the post-reform period.  But the 
magnitude of the difference-in-differences effect for affected immigrants (0.5 percentage points 
in the low earners model) is only half as large as the difference-in-differences effect for 
unaffected immigrants (1.1 percentage points in the low earners model).  These results suggest 
that, although the probability of SSI participation among immigrants as a whole increased in the 
post-reform period relative to otherwise similar native-born individuals, the welfare reforms led 
to substantial reductions in the probability of SSI participation among those immigrants who 
were affected by the legislation (i.e., immigrants who were not receiving SSI in August, 1996, 
and non-refugee, non-asylee immigrants who entered the U.S. after August, 1996).    16
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Before 1996, Congress dealt with legal immigration more or less “directly” by means of a 
three-tier (world, country, and preference category) system of controls.  Although this system 
remained in effect after 1996, the welfare reform policies enacted in that year introduced a new 
dimension in the U.S. immigrant admittance program.  Now legal immigrants were limited in 
their eligibility for certain social programs.  If immigrants were coming to the United States to 
enjoy various social benefits, at least some of those benefits would now be denied them. 
In this paper, our specific focus is on SSI participation, and we use a unique set of 
administrative data to estimate a number of models of such participation.  Our probit results 
clearly show that immigrants are more likely to participate in SSI than the native born, that 
females are less likely to participate than males, and that older persons are less likely to 
participate than younger.  Immigrants who entered the U.S. between 1960 and 1996 are 
significantly more likely to participate than natives, whereas immigrants who entered before 
1960 or after 1996 are less likely to participate than natives. 
A series of difference-in-differences models suggests that the probability of SSI 
participation by immigrants increased in the post-welfare reform period relative to otherwise 
similar natives.  When we identify immigrants whose potential SSI eligibility was affected by 
welfare reform separately from those whose potential SSI eligibility was not affected, we find 
that the probability of SSI participation among affected immigrants declined significantly after 
the implementation of welfare reform relative to unaffected immigrants.  Although both groups 
of immigrants are significantly more likely to participate in the post-reform period than   17
otherwise similar natives, it appears that the welfare reform legislation led to reductions in the 
probability of SSI participation among affected immigrants relative to unaffected immigrants. 
This is an important finding given that the vast majority of immigrants are in the affected 
group with respect to potential SSI eligibility.  Only those immigrants who were receiving SSI in 
August, 1996, or who entered the U.S. as refugees or asylees and have been in the country for 
seven years or less, are unaffected by the provisions of welfare reform.  As time passes and new 
immigrants continue to enter the U.S. in large numbers, the affected group will continue to grow.  
To the extent that the source-country composition of new immigrants to the U.S. continues to be 
dominated by countries with higher propensities for welfare participation, and the skill-
composition of new immigrants continues to deteriorate, welfare reform will continue to impose 
strong restrictions on the welfare utilization of immigrants.  On the other hand, immigrants who 
become naturalized U.S. citizens transition from affected to unaffected status, and thus undo 
some of the restrictions imposed by welfare reform.  To the extent that immigrants from source 
countries with higher propensities for welfare participation have higher naturalization rates, this 
can become an important avenue for canceling out some of the impact of welfare reform.  18
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Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions, Foreign Born and Native Born, 1993-1999
Foreign Born Native Born
Variable Definition Mean Std Err Mean Std Err
SSI_CY Receipt of SSI 0.0301 0.0001 0.0160 0.0001
SSIPMT_CY SSI benefit (annual) 143.7142 0.7624 56.1715 0.4317
AGE Age 41.1111 0.0122 41.1387 0.0120
FEMALE Female 0.4649 0.0004 0.4958 0.0004
TTCOMP_TH Total annual compensation (thousands of $) 17.1518 0.0435 20.3014 0.0403
NJOBS Number of jobs held in a year 1.0996 0.0010 1.2568 0.0009
MOVED Lived in a different state in the previous year 0.0570 0.0002 0.0743 0.0002
FB Foreign born 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AFFECTED Foreign born and affected by welfare reform 0.9371 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
CHINA Born in China 0.0262 0.0001 ---- ----
CUBA Born in Cuba 0.0330 0.0001 ---- ----
DOMREP Born in the Dominican Republic 0.0245 0.0001 ---- ----
INDIA Born in India 0.0325 0.0001 ---- ----
IRAN Born in Iran 0.0117 0.0001 ---- ----
KOREAS Born in North Korea or South Korea 0.0258 0.0001 ---- ----
LAOS Born in Laos 0.0087 0.0001 ---- ----
MEXICO Born in Mexico 0.2054 0.0003 ---- ----
PHILIP Born in the Philippines 0.0566 0.0002 ---- ----
RUSSIA Born in Russia 0.0195 0.0001 ---- ----
TAIWAN Born in Taiwan 0.0197 0.0001 ---- ----
VIETNAM Born in Vietnam 0.0378 0.0002 ---- ----
FB_OTHER Born in a country other than those listed above 0.4984 0.0004 ---- ----
ENTLE39 Entered the U.S. before 1940 0.0066 0.0001 ---- ----
ENT4049 Entered the U.S. between 1940 and 1949 0.0076 0.0001 ---- ----
ENT5059 Entered the U.S. between 1950 and 1959 0.0317 0.0001 ---- ----
ENT6069 Entered the U.S. between 1960 and 1969 0.1046 0.0003 ---- ----
ENT7079 Entered the U.S. between 1970 and 1979 0.2202 0.0003 ---- ----
ENT8089 Entered the U.S. between 1980 and 1989 0.3729 0.0004 ---- ----
ENT9096 Entered the U.S. between 1990 and 1996 0.2313 0.0003 ---- ----
ENT9799 Entered the U.S. after 1996 0.0252 0.0001 ---- ----
UR State unemployment rate 5.8603 0.0012 5.2966 0.0011
POV State poverty rate 14.8211 0.0030 13.6016 0.0029
EARNPW_TH State earnings per worker (thousands of $) 37.5516 0.0046 34.9048 0.0045
GENEROUS Generous state welfare policies toward immigrants 0.7431 0.0004 0.5027 0.0004
AFDCW State AFDC waivers implemented 0.6412 0.0004 0.5676 0.0004
TIMP State TANF program implemented 0.4038 0.0004 0.4260 0.0004
ATMAX3 State maximum AFDC/TANF benefit for family of three 460.6195 0.1238 390.8886 0.1151
SUPP Maximum SSI state supplement 70.8272 0.0610 37.5529 0.0485
N Number of observations 1,455,274 1,575,576Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Foreign Born and Native Born, Pre-Welfare Reform (1993-1995), Year of Welfare Reform (1996),
and Post-Welfare Reform (1997-1999)
Pre-Welfare Reform (1993-1995) Year of Welfare Reform (1996) Post-Welfare Reform (1997-1999)
Foreign Born Native Born Foreign Born Native Born Foreign Born Native Born
Variable Mean Std Err Mean Std Err Mean Std Err Mean Std Err Mean Std Err Mean Std Err
SSI_CY 0.0308 0.0002 0.0167 0.0002 0.0311 0.0004 0.0163 0.0003 0.0291 0.0002 0.0151 0.0001
SSIPMT_CY 141.2995 1.1890 55.5559 0.6542 149.6986 2.0543 58.2165 1.1694 143.9128 1.1335 56.0834 0.6579
AGE 40.2299 0.0192 40.2104 0.0183 41.0311 0.0323 41.1307 0.0318 41.8821 0.0181 41.9890 0.0184
FEMALE 0.4666 0.0007 0.4974 0.0006 0.4657 0.0011 0.4965 0.0011 0.4633 0.0006 0.4942 0.0006
TTCOMP_TH 15.2493 0.0510 18.8413 0.0477 16.5117 0.1228 19.9247 0.0936 18.9606 0.0742 21.7544 0.0728
NJOBS 1.0791 0.0015 1.2522 0.0014 1.0887 0.0025 1.2586 0.0025 1.1203 0.0014 1.2605 0.0014
MOVED 0.0732 0.0003 0.1018 0.0004 0.0441 0.0004 0.0528 0.0005 0.0473 0.0003 0.0559 0.0003
FB 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AFFECTED 0.9325 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.9331 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.9422 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
CHINA 0.0251 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0263 0.0004 ---- ---- 0.0271 0.0002 ---- ----
CUBA 0.0337 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0336 0.0004 ---- ---- 0.0322 0.0002 ---- ----
DOMREP 0.0241 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0246 0.0003 ---- ---- 0.0248 0.0002 ---- ----
INDIA 0.0303 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0320 0.0004 ---- ---- 0.0346 0.0002 ---- ----
IRAN 0.0121 0.0001 ---- ---- 0.0117 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0114 0.0001 ---- ----
KOREAS 0.0263 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0258 0.0003 ---- ---- 0.0255 0.0002 ---- ----
LAOS 0.0090 0.0001 ---- ---- 0.0087 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0084 0.0001 ---- ----
MEXICO 0.2089 0.0005 ---- ---- 0.2050 0.0009 ---- ---- 0.2026 0.0005 ---- ----
PHILIP 0.0572 0.0003 ---- ---- 0.0569 0.0005 ---- ---- 0.0560 0.0003 ---- ----
RUSSIA 0.0199 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0198 0.0003 ---- ---- 0.0191 0.0002 ---- ----
TAIWAN 0.0206 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0199 0.0003 ---- ---- 0.0189 0.0002 ---- ----
VIETNAM 0.0383 0.0003 ---- ---- 0.0382 0.0004 ---- ---- 0.0372 0.0002 ---- ----
FB_OTHER 0.4945 0.0007 ---- ---- 0.4974 0.0011 ---- ---- 0.5021 0.0006 ---- ----
ENTLE39 0.0072 0.0001 ---- ---- 0.0066 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0061 0.0001 ---- ----
ENT4049 0.0083 0.0001 ---- ---- 0.0075 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0070 0.0001 ---- ----
ENT5059 0.0347 0.0002 ---- ---- 0.0317 0.0004 ---- ---- 0.0292 0.0002 ---- ----
ENT6069 0.1142 0.0004 ---- ---- 0.1043 0.0007 ---- ---- 0.0965 0.0004 ---- ----
ENT7079 0.2391 0.0006 ---- ---- 0.2198 0.0009 ---- ---- 0.2042 0.0005 ---- ----
ENT8089 0.3937 0.0006 ---- ---- 0.3725 0.0011 ---- ---- 0.3553 0.0006 ---- ----
ENT9096 0.2028 0.0005 ---- ---- 0.2575 0.0010 ---- ---- 0.2474 0.0005 ---- ----
ENT9799 0.0000 0.0000 ---- ---- 0.0000 0.0000 ---- ---- 0.0543 0.0003 ---- ----
UR 6.9037 0.0019 6.1310 0.0017 5.9498 0.0023 5.3563 0.0022 4.9490 0.0012 4.5157 0.0012
POV 15.1549 0.0044 14.3406 0.0045 15.7416 0.0087 14.0196 0.0082 14.2543 0.0045 12.7940 0.0041
EARNPW_TH 34.4749 0.0056 32.1530 0.0055 36.8335 0.0100 34.2924 0.0101 40.3790 0.0064 37.6123 0.0066
GENEROUS 0.7502 0.0006 0.5072 0.0006 0.7446 0.0010 0.5027 0.0011 0.7367 0.0005 0.4986 0.0006
AFDCW 0.4311 0.0006 0.2814 0.0005 0.6905 0.0009 0.6607 0.0008 0.8041 0.0005 0.7993 0.0005
TIMP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0706 0.0002 0.0975 0.0002 0.8486 0.0004 0.9194 0.0003
ATMAX3 466.1018 0.2025 391.3417 0.1825 462.6339 0.3291 390.2700 0.3033 455.3544 0.1771 390.6717 0.1699
SUPP 73.6333 0.1003 39.1198 0.0789 68.7270 0.1540 36.4726 0.1238 69.0985 0.0881 36.4657 0.0706
N 644,862 571,825 706,180 675,127 224,534 208,322Table 3: Probit Estimates of SSI Participation among the Native Born
and Foreign Born, 1993-1999
Dependent
Variable: SSI_CY (1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables
AGE -0.000002 *** -0.000001 *** -0.000002 ***
AGE2 0.000000 *** 0.000000 *** 0.000000 ***
FEMALE -0.000022 *** -0.000019 ** -0.000024 ***
FEMALE_AGE -0.000002 *** -0.000002 *** -0.000002 ***
FEMALE_AGE2 0.000000 *** 0.000000 *** 0.000000 ***
TTCOMP_TH -0.000028 *** -0.000027 *** -0.000027 ***
NJOBS -0.000055 *** -0.000054 *** -0.000054 ***























UR 0.000004 *** 0.000004 *** 0.000004 ***
POV 0.000002 *** 0.000002 *** 0.000002 ***
EARNPW_TH -0.000001 *** -0.000001 *** -0.000001 ***
GENEROUS -0.000007 *** -0.000009 *** -0.000007 ***
AFDCW 0.000005 *** 0.000005 *** 0.000005 ***
TIMP -0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000003
ATMAX3 0.000000 *** 0.000000 *** 0.000000 ***
SUPP 0.000000 *** 0.000000 *** 0.000000 ***
Observations 3030850 3030850 3030850
Log L -196256.25 -195304.13 -196015.3
Pseudo R2 0.2534 0.257 0.2543
Coefficients have been transformed to represent marginal effects.
Year fixed effects included in all models.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 4: Probit Estimates of SSI Participation among the Native Born
and Foreign Born, Low Earner Sample, 1993-1999
Dependent
Variable: SSI_CY (1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables
AGE -0.000209 *** -0.000188 *** -0.000214 ***
AGE2 0.000003 *** 0.000003 *** 0.000003 ***
FEMALE -0.003433 *** -0.003145 *** -0.003696 ***
FEMALE_AGE -0.000264 *** -0.000280 *** -0.000246 ***
FEMALE_AGE2 0.000008 *** 0.000008 *** 0.000007 ***
TTCOMP_TH -0.004475 *** -0.004444 *** -0.004470 ***
NJOBS -0.006155 *** -0.006090 *** -0.006093 ***























UR 0.000578 *** 0.000572 *** 0.000548 ***
POV 0.000312 *** 0.000299 *** 0.000310 ***
EARNPW_TH -0.000169 *** -0.000142 *** -0.000164 ***
GENEROUS -0.001027 *** -0.001337 *** -0.001023 ***
AFDCW 0.000649 *** 0.000641 *** 0.000573 ***
TIMP -0.000255 -0.000299 -0.000235
ATMAX3 -0.000006 *** -0.000007 *** -0.000006 ***
SUPP 0.000017 *** 0.000017 *** 0.000016 ***
Observations 1615311 1615311 1615311
Log L -205407.14 -204394.93 -205147.99
Pseudo R2 0.1425 0.1467 0.1436
Coefficients have been transformed to represent marginal effects.
Year fixed effects included in all models.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 5: Probit Models of SSI Participation, Difference in Difference Estimates
Dependent
Variable: SSI_CY (1) (2) (3) (4)
Model
Independent Variables
AGE -0.000001 *** 0.000001 *** -0.000001 *** 0.000000
AGE2 0.000000 *** 0.000000 ** 0.000000 *** 0.000000 **
FEMALE -0.000021 ** -0.000009 *** -0.000021 *** -0.000005
FEMALE_AGE -0.000002 *** 0.000000 * -0.000002 *** -0.000002 ***
FEMALE_AGE2 0.000000 *** 0.000000 0.000000 *** 0.000000 ***
TTCOMP_TH -0.000025 *** -0.000003 *** -0.000024 *** -0.000019 ***
NJOBS -0.000048 *** -0.000007 *** -0.000049 *** -0.000036 ***
MOVED -0.000029 *** 0.000004 ** -0.000029 *** -0.000022 ***
AFFECTED -0.012525 *** -0.000078 *** -0.000098 ***
NB -0.006070 ***
FB 0.000044 ***
POSTWR -0.000006 0.000003 *** -0.000003 0.000056 ***
POSTWR_AFFECTED -0.000008 *** 0.000030 *** -0.000029 ***
POSTWR_NB -0.000063 ***
FB_POSTWR 0.000022 ***
UR 0.000005 *** 0.000000 0.000005 *** 0.000003 ***
POV 0.000002 *** 0.000000 *** 0.000003 *** 0.000001 ***
EARNPW_TH -0.000001 *** 0.000000 *** 0.000000 ** -0.000001 ***
GENEROUS -0.000007 *** 0.000000 0.000001 -0.000008 ***
AFDCW 0.000005 *** -0.000001 ** 0.000009 *** 0.000002 **
TIMP -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000004 0.000001
ATMAX3 0.000000 *** 0.000000 0.000000 *** 0.000000 ***
SUPP 0.000000 *** 0.000000 *** 0.000000 *** 0.000000 ***
Observations 2,597,994 1,246,952 2,597,994 2,597,994
Log L
Pseudo R2 0.2539 0.6894 0.2620 0.2985
The pre-reform period covers 1993-1995.  The post reform period covers 1997-1999.
Coefficients have been transformed to represent marginal effects.
Year fixed effects included in all models.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%





controls for foreign 
born vs. native born
Affected vs. 
unaffected with 
controls for foreign 
born vs. native born
Foreign born vs. 
native born, no 
controls for affected 
statusTable 6: Probit Models of SSI Participation, Difference in Difference Estimates, Low Earners
Dependent
Variable: SSI_CY (1) (2) (3) (4)
Model
Independent Variables
AGE -0.000210 *** 0.000194 *** -0.000178 *** -0.000065 *
AGE2 0.000003 *** 0.000000 *** 0.000003 *** 0.000001 ***
FEMALE -0.003504 *** -0.001544 *** -0.003516 *** -0.001166
FEMALE_AGE -0.000253 *** 0.000021 -0.000249 *** -0.000341 ***
FEMALE_AGE2 0.000008 *** 0.000000 0.000007 *** 0.000008 ***
TTCOMP_TH -0.004507 *** -0.000589 *** -0.004175 *** -0.004068 ***
NJOBS -0.005895 *** -0.001093 *** -0.005967 *** -0.005303 ***
MOVED -0.004753 *** 0.000802 *** -0.004602 *** -0.004257 ***
AFFECTED -0.194425 *** -0.015153 *** -0.021722 ***
NB -0.195265 ***
FB 0.005976 ***
POSTWR -0.001036 * 0.000516 *** -0.000658 0.009760 ***
POSTWR_AFFECTED -0.001441 *** 0.004063 *** -0.006010 ***
POSTWR_NB -0.011014 ***
FB_POSTWR 0.003087 ***
UR 0.000666 *** -0.000024 0.000748 *** 0.000568 ***
POV 0.000298 *** 0.000064 *** 0.000439 *** 0.000244 ***
EARNPW_TH -0.000164 *** 0.000017 ** -0.000061 *** -0.000096 ***
GENEROUS -0.001088 *** 0.000074 0.000033 -0.001437 ***
AFDCW 0.000686 *** -0.000151 ** 0.001238 *** 0.000340 *
TIMP 0.000035 -0.000145 -0.000381 0.000294
ATMAX3 -0.000006 *** 0.000000 -0.000005 *** -0.000006 ***
SUPP 0.000017 *** 0.000004 *** 0.000018 *** 0.000013 ***
Observations 1,381,433 712,493 1,381,433 1,381,433
Log L
Pseudo R2 0.1427 0.6505 0.1520 0.1945
The pre-reform period covers 1993-1995.  The post reform period covers 1997-1999.
Coefficients have been transformed to represent marginal effects.
Year fixed effects included in all models.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%





controls for foreign 
born vs. native born
Affected vs. 
unaffected with 
controls for foreign 
born vs. native born
Foreign born vs. 
native born, no 
controls for affected 




1 Foreign born vs. native born, no 
controls for affected status
Foreign born vs. native born 0.0022
2 Foreign born only, affected vs. 
unaffected
Affected vs. unaffected foreign born -0.0008
3 Affected vs. unaffected, no controls for 
foreign born vs. native born
Affected vs. unaffected foreign born
and native born
0.0030
4 Affected vs. unaffected with controls 
for foreign born vs. native born
Affected vs. unaffected foreign born -0.0029
4 Affected vs. unaffected with controls 
for foreign born vs. native born
Affected vs. native born 0.0034
4 Affected vs. unaffected with controls 
for foreign born vs. native born
Unaffected foreign born vs.
unaffected native born
0.0063
1 Foreign born vs. native born, no 
controls for affected status
Foreign born vs. native born 0.3087
2 Foreign born only, affected vs. 
unaffected
Affected vs. unaffected foreign born -0.1441
3 Affected vs. unaffected, no controls for 
foreign born vs. native born
Affected vs. unaffected foreign born
and native born
0.4063
4 Affected vs. unaffected with controls 
for foreign born vs. native born
Affected vs. unaffected foreign born -0.6010
4 Affected vs. unaffected with controls 
for foreign born vs. native born
Affected vs. native born 0.5004
4 Affected vs. unaffected with controls 
for foreign born vs. native born
Unaffected foreign born vs.
unaffected native born
1.1014
All individuals
Low Earners